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1. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221 (2004)
(describing the various corporate scandals following Enron); Michael A. Perino, Enron’s
Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 671 (2002) (“Since Enron’s implosion, an astounding string
of accounting scandals have stunned the securities markets.”).
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Introduction
Occasionally, an event occurs which seems to mark the beginning of a new
era, an irreversible shift in both perception and focus that changes the way we
view the past and the present.  When, in October of 2001, Enron collapsed as
a result of corporate accounting fraud, many believed just such a day had
arrived, and the quick succession of corporate scandals that followed only
served to reinforce this belief.1  WorldCom, Adelphia, Symbol Technologies,
Dynegy, HealthSouth, and others combined to create a blinding image of greed
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2. See President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Presentation of the Malcolm Baldrige
National Quality Awards, 1 PUB. PAPERS 356 (Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_public_papers_vol1_misc&age=356
position=all.
XXYou know, we’re passing through extraordinary times here in America.  We
fight a war—a real war—to protect our homeland by bringing terrorists to
justice. . . .  
XXAmerica is [also] ushering in a responsibility era, a culture regaining a sense
of personal responsibility, where each of us understands we’re responsible for the
decisions we make in life.  And this new culture must include a renewed sense of
corporate responsibility.
Id. at 358.
3. Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 721, 721 (2005) (“As the media exposed ever more corporate corruption and
shady dealing, lawmakers competed to prove their toughness on crime by raising sentences.”).
and corruption that drew America into yet another war, a war on financial
crimes.2
The government wasted no time responding to growing angst amongst
investors and outrage throughout the country as thousands lost their life
savings.  The President, Congress, Department of Justice (DOJ), and United
States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) all acted to “get
tough” on corporate criminals.3  Predominantly these government institutions
focused on two reforms aimed at restoring confidence in the American financial
system: increasing the number of criminal offenses available to prosecutors to
fight fraud and increasing the prison sentences for those convicted.  With these
new tools, the government assured America that enforcement would increase
and punishments would grow steadily more severe.  So convincing were such
proclamations, some in the legal community actually became concerned that
increasing enforcement and lengthening sentences would lead to decreasing
rates of plea bargaining.  Seven years later, one must wonder whether all the
predictions have become reality.  It is certainly true that reforms in the shape of
statutes and policies flowed from all sectors of American government following
Enron.  But such efforts mean little if the machine of federal prosecution did not
change in response.
A review of statistics tracking government prosecutions, prison sentences,
and rates of plea bargaining reveals that not only has the government’s focus
on financial crimes not increased, but prison sentences for fraud have remained
stagnant.  Furthermore, the fears of those who believed plea bargaining was in
jeopardy were unfounded.  Plea bargaining continues to succeed in over 95%
of federal cases.  Why then did the predicted revolution in financial crimes
prosecution not take shape, and why did so much effort die in the trenches of
this American war?  The answer, it appears, may be plea bargaining itself.
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4. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003), reprinted as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 509
(Supp. IV 2004).
While prosecutors could have chosen to use new statutes and amendments to
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines) passed in the
wake of Enron to increase prosecutions and sentences, they did not.  Instead,
prosecutors are using their new tools to encourage defendants to accept plea
agreements that include sentences similar to those offered before 2001, while
simultaneously threatening to use these same powers to secure astounding
sentences if defendants force a trial.  The result is that the promises of post-
Enron reforms aimed at financial criminals were unfulfilled and served only to
reinforce plea bargaining’s triumph.
Part I of this article examines the changes implemented by the government
following the corporate scandals of 2001, many of which were directed at all
manner of financial crimes, not just catastrophic corporate fraud.  Part II
discusses the proclamations made by the government regarding the success of
the war on financial crimes and the predictions by the public, scholars, and the
defense bar regarding the impact of post-Enron reforms.  Part III analyzes
Sentencing Commission statistics from 1995 through 2006 and reveals that
since Enron, the government’s focus on financial crimes has actually decreased,
prison sentences for those convicted of fraud have remained stagnant, and the
percentage of federal cases resulting in plea agreements has remained above
94.5%.  Finally, Part IV postulates that, after all the government did in response
to corporate accounting scandals, little has actually changed because
prosecutors are using post-Enron reforms to encourage defendants to enter into
plea agreements.
I. A Quick Road to the Front
On July 9, 2002, President Bush created the Corporate Fraud Task Force, an
organization of government agencies formed to “investigate and prosecute
significant financial crimes, recover the proceeds of such crimes, and ensure
just and effective punishment of those who perpetrate financial crimes.”4  In a
speech describing the new Task Force, the President summarized the war that
was taking place on Wall Street and in board rooms across the country.
Today, by executive order, I create a new Corporate Fraud Task
Force, headed by the Deputy Attorney General, which will target
major accounting fraud and other criminal activity in corporate
finance.  The task force will function as a financial crimes SWAT
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5. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Corporate Responsibility in New York City,
2 PUB. PAPERS 1194, 1196 (July 9, 2002), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getpage.cgi?position=all&page=1196&dbname=2002_public_papers_vol2_misc.
6. See Letter from Eric H. Jaso, Counselor to the Assistant Att’y Gen., to Diana E.
Murphy, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Chair (Dec. 18, 2002), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT’G REP.
278, 278 (2003) [hereinafter December Letter from Eric H. Jaso] (discussing proposed
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines).
As we [the DOJ] have stated consistently, we believe that these penalty increases
should apply not only to the billion-dollar cases that have dominated the news
headlines in recent months, but also to the many so-called “lower-loss” criminal
fraud cases that make up the bulk of federal prosecutions across the country.  In
addition to the WorldComs and Enrons, the Department prosecutes many smaller-
scale frauds around the country that, while evidently less newsworthy, nonetheless
constitute heart-rending calamities for their victims.  Congress did not intend to
ignore such cases and reserve severe punishment only for those whose illegal
deeds make the front page.
Id.
7. Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres?: The Curious History and
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 435 (2004). 
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.); see also Perino, supra note 1, at 672 (“[SOX] moved
with [lightning] speed through the legislature and only seemed to pick up momentum with the
revelation of each new accounting restatement.”).  
XXPresident Bush signed SOX into law on July 30, 2002.  See President George W. Bush,
Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1319, 1319 (July 30,
2002), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_public_
papers_vol2_misc&page=1319&position=all.  The three titles most relevant to prosecution and
punishment of financial crimes are Titles VII, IX, and XI of SOX.  Title VII created new
obstruction of justice statutes, protected employees who reported criminal conduct up the
team, overseeing the investigation of corporate abusers and bringing
them to account.5
This new financial SWAT team was only the beginning of a campaign of
reforms aimed at increased prosecutions and sentences.  While particular
reforms, such as the creation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force itself, focused
exclusively on catastrophic corporate fraud, many of the changes impacted
financial crimes and fraud more generally.  By implementing broad reforms
alongside more targeted initiatives, the government took aim at all manner of
economic wrongdoing in an effort to “win the war” on financial crimes.6
A. Congress
As one scholar aptly stated of Congress’s reaction to Enron and other
corporate scandals, “Congress got in a tizzy over the crime du jour.”7  The
result of this frantic effort was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).8
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ladder, and created a Title 18 Securities and Exchange commission offense.  Title IX enhanced
punishments for already existing crimes, created new criminal statutes, and directed the
Sentencing Commission to amend the Sentencing Guidelines to reflect the seriousness of the
crimes addressed in the legislation.  Title XI also addressed obstruction of justice and retaliation
by employers.  See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
9. Bush, supra note 8, at 1319. 
10. December Letter from Eric H. Jaso, supra note 6, at 278.
11. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006) (imposing criminal penalties for mail and wire
fraud); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 378-79 (2003) (comparing pre-SOX and post-
SOX penalties for fraud). 
12. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343; see also Perino, supra note 1, at 672 (“In addition to
creating new crimes, [SOX] beefs up the penalties for certain existing crimes.  Maximum
penalties for mail and wire fraud are increased from five to twenty years.”).  
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (defining punishment for attempts and conspiracies to commit
criminal fraud offenses).  SOX mandates:  
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter
Heralded by President Bush as one of “the most far-reaching reforms of
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt,” the
law sought to restore investor confidence through sweeping changes to
corporate structure and criminal statutes.9
As described by the DOJ, SOX contains provisions that reached white-collar
crime on all levels, not just the small class of corporate malfeasance that ignited
the rush to reform.
Central to [SOX] were substantial increases in the statutory
penalties for the crimes most commonly charged by federal
prosecutors in corporate fraud and obstruction-of-justice cases (so-
called “white collar” crimes); [SOX] included specific and general
directives to the United States Sentencing Commission to
implement amendments to the sentencing guidelines responsive to
these changes, and provided emergency amendment authority to
underscore the urgency of taking prompt and substantive action.10
By creating new laws and amending old fraud provisions, SOX took aim at all
financial crimes in an effort to increase prosecutions and prison sentences for
an enormous class of defendants, not just the limited number of officers and
directors involved in the major scandals of the day.
SOX’s first sweeping reform was to impose a fourfold increase in the
maximum punishments for mail and wire fraud.11  Prior to SOX, the maximum
penalty for these commonly charged fraud statutes was five years.  Under the
revised statute, the maximum penalty skyrocketed to twenty years.12  Similarly,
SOX also increased the maximum penalty for attempt and conspiracy to
defraud to twenty years.13  Finally, SOX created the first criminal code
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shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the
commission of which was the object of the attempt of conspiracy.
Id. 
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348; see also Brickey, supra note 1, at 231 (“[SOX] adds the first
securities fraud crime to be codified in the federal criminal code . . . .”).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348.  
16. See id.
17. See Prosecution Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18, 21, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).  
18. PROTECT Act § 401(b)(1).  The Department of Justice reiterated this policy in its
September 22, 2003, memorandum regarding plea bargaining and charging decisions.  See
Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003),
reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 129, 132 (2003) [hereinafter September Memorandum]
(regarding the Department of Justice policy concerning charging criminal offenses, disposition
of charges and sentencing) (“Accordingly, federal prosecutors must not request or accede to a
downward departure except in the limited circumstances specified in this memorandum and
with authorization from an Assistant Attorney General, United States Attorney, or designated
supervisory attorney.”); see also Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors
as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1248 (2004) (“The Feeney Amendment, as enacted in
the PROTECT Act, revealed deep Congressional dissatisfaction with the operation of the
provision for securities fraud.14  Mimicking the language used in the wire and
mail fraud statutes, the securities provision created an offense for knowingly
executing a scheme or artifice to defraud any person in connection with any
security or in the purchase or sale of any security.15  Perhaps believing a twenty
year sentence for an offense so closely linked with the ongoing scandals
unsuitable, SOX prescribed a maximum sentence of twenty-five years for this
crime.16  For prosecutors, SOX offered new tools to fight fraud inside and
outside of corporate America and signaled that so-called white-collar criminals
would no longer enjoy preferential treatment in a criminal justice system that
had been wildly increasing sentences for varying types of offenses for over a
decade.
B. Department of Justice
Similar to Congress, the DOJ did not limit its reforms after Enron to
catastrophic corporate fraud, though reforms such as the creation of the
Corporate Fraud Task Force were certainly specifically directed at this area.
Rather, many of the DOJ’s most important new policies affected defendants
throughout the federal system.
The first significant reform came in response to the PROTECT Act and the
Feeney Amendment in 2003.17  The Feeney Amendment prohibited federal
judges from making downward departures during sentencing for any reason
other than those specifically enumerated in the Sentencing Guidelines.18
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federal guidelines system it had created.”). 
19. PROTECT Act § 401(c)(1); see also Joy Anne Boyd, Commentary, Power, Policy, and
Practice: The Department of Justice’s Plea Bargain Policy as Applied to the Federal
Prosecutor’s Power Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 602
(2004) (“The practical effect of this portion of the Feeney Amendment is to drastically reduce
the opportunity for federal defendants to obtain more lenient sentences.”).  
20. See Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors
(July 28, 2003), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 375 (2003) [hereinafter July Memorandum]
(regarding the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act); see also Miller, supra note 18, at
1246 (“The Act directed the Department to adopt policies that discourage downward departures
and encourage appeals of downward departures.”).
21. See Miller, supra note 18, at 1255.
22. See Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial
Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 308 (2004) (“The politics of being
tough on crime trumps the [Sentencing] Commission’s technocratic expertise.  The obvious
result is more rules and fewer unilateral judicial departures.  The less obvious result is a transfer
of even more plea-bargaining power from judges to prosecutors, resulting in higher sentences
on prosecutors’ terms.”).  
23. September Memorandum, supra note 18, at 130 (regarding the Department of Justice
policy concerning charging criminal offenses, disposition of charges, and sentencing).
XXThe government’s aversion to charge bargaining and fact bargaining was revealed in the
Furthermore, the amendment required that when such departures were made,
the departing judge had to place the reasons for the decision in writing.19  On
July 28, 2003, the DOJ clarified its support for the Feeney Amendment’s
restrictions on judicial discretion and instructed federal prosecutors regarding
new procedures which would be implemented to ensure compliance.20  The
memorandum required prosecutors to vigorously oppose court actions that were
inconsistent with the goals of the Feeney Amendment and to report federal
judges who violated the Amendment’s prohibitions.21  The goal of the
Department’s memorandum was, in essence, to further restrict a defendant’s
ability to receive departures and, thus, increase prison sentences.22
The second major reform came on September 22, 2003, when Attorney
General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum to all United States Attorneys
clarifying the government’s position on plea bargaining and the charging of
criminal offenses.
It is the policy of the Department of Justice that, in all federal
criminal cases, federal prosecutors must charge and pursue the most
serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by
the facts of the case . . . .  The most serious offense or offenses are
those that generate the most substantial sentence under the
Sentencing Guidelines, unless a mandatory minimum sentence or
count requiring a consecutive sentence would generate a longer
sentence.23
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July Memorandum from Attorney General Ashcroft regarding the Feeney Amendment, though
this aversion was not discussed in as extensive detail as it was in the subsequent September
Memorandum.
Similarly, in negotiating plea agreements that address sentencing issues, federal
prosecutors may not “fact bargain,” or be party to any plea agreement that results
in the sentencing court having less than a full understanding of all readily provable
facts relevant to sentencing.  Nor may prosecutors reach agreements about
Sentencing Guidelines factors that are not fully consistent with the readily
provable facts.
July Memorandum, supra note 20, at 376 (regarding the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT
Act). 
24. See Miller, supra note 18, at 1254 (“The memorandum includes fierce language
mandating charges and limiting various kinds of plea bargains, subject only to ‘certain limited
exceptions.’”); see also Boyd, supra note 19 (discussing the September Memorandum).  
25. Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial
Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1063, 1077 (2006) (“Although there are some limited exceptions to this ‘no charge bargaining’
policy, the duty to charge ‘the most serious, readily provable offense(s)’ impacts the kind of
plea offers an [Assistant United States Attorney] may make or what counter-offers an [Assistant
United States Attorney] may accept.” (footnotes omitted)); Miller, supra note 18, at 1256 (“It
is striking that in 2003, after fifteen years of directing line prosecutors to make consistent, fully
revealed and tough judgments, the Attorney General would think it necessary to again forbid
concealment of facts, fact bargains, and agreements ‘not fully consistent with the readily
provable facts.’”).
26. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 657
(1981).
Plea negotiation works . . . only because defendants have been led to believe that
their bargains are in fact bargains.  If this belief is erroneous, it seems likely that
the defendants have been deluded into sacrificing their constitutional rights for
nothing.  Unless the advocates of plea bargaining contend that defendants should
be misled, they apparently must defend the proposition that these defendants’
pleas should make some difference in their sentences.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The memorandum dictated that prosecutors stop offering reduced sentences in
return for plea agreements if such deals excluded a readily provable offense for
which the sentence was greater.24  While many United States Attorney’s Offices
disputed the claim that this policy was not already in place, the reality of the
plea bargaining machine before this memorandum was issued necessitated
charge bargaining that led to a reduction in sentence.25  If this were not the case,
little incentive would have existed to encourage defendants to accept the
government’s offer.26  Once again, through DOJ policy memoranda, the
government implemented reforms aimed at increasing the average sentence of
everyone in the criminal system, including financial criminals.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss3/1
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27. For a thorough examination of the 2001 Economic Crime Package, see Frank O.
Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and
Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 7 (2001) [hereinafter Bowman, Sentencing Reforms]
(“These measures, known collectively as the ‘economic crime package,’ were the culmination
of some six years of consultation and debate by the Sentencing Commission, the defense bar,
the Justice Department, probation officers, the Criminal Law Committee of the U.S. Judicial
Conference (CLC), and the occasional academic commentator.”); Frank O. Bowman, III, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and What Came After, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 231, 231-32 (2003) [hereinafter
Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act] (“A year before the corporate scandals of 2002, the Sentencing
Commission passed the so-called Economic Crime Package, a set of guidelines amendments
effective in November 2001 that completely overhauled the sentencing of economic crime
offenses.  This package was the product of more than five years of careful study, consultation,
and negotiation among the Commission, judges, probation officers, defense counsel, and the
Department of Justice.”).  
28. Bowman, supra note 7, at 389 (“The practical result was to slightly lower the sentences
of some classes of low-loss offenders, while raising significantly the sentences of most mid- to
high-loss offenders.”).  
29. See Letter from Eric H. Jaso, Counselor to the Assistant Att’y Gen., to Diana E.
Murphy, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Chair (Oct. 1, 2002), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 270,
271 (2003) [hereinafter October Letter from Eric H. Jaso] (“[W]e remain concerned that the
November 2001 amendments, which decreased sentences for lower-loss offenses, in particular
for those offenders responsible for losses under $70,000, will have a widespread detrimental
affect [on] our ability to punish, and, as a result, to deter, such crimes.”); see also Bowman,
supra note 7, at 412 (“In June 2002, the Department had pronounced itself happy with the 2001
Economic Crime Package, saving only its sentences for low-loss offenders.”).  
30. See Bowman, supra note 7, at 392 (“On December 2, 2001, barely a month after the
new economic crime guideline amendments became effective, the Enron Corporation filed the
C. United States Sentencing Commission
The final piece of the revolution regarding financial crimes came from the
Sentencing Commission.  Demands to increase sentences for financial crimes,
however, predated the calamities of 2001.  Responding to pressures that had
begun in the mid-1990s—and shortly before Enron’s collapse—the Sentencing
Commission adopted significant changes to the Sentencing Guidelines with the
implementation of the 2001 Economic Crime Package.27  The reform package,
which included consolidating fraud guidelines, amending loss tables, and
modifying various other provisions, focused on significantly raising the
sentencing ranges for mid-level and high-level fraud.28  While the government
seemed satisfied with these amendments at the time of their passage, the DOJ
expressed concern that defendants charged with low-level fraud would not also
face steeper sentences.29  The government did not have to wait long to correct
this perceived oversight.
The ink had barely dried on the 2001 Economic Crime Package when the
Enron scandal revealed itself.30  In an approach quite opposite to the six years
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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largest bankruptcy petition in U.S. history.”); Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 27, at
232 (“[W]hen corporate scandal began dominating the news in early 2002, the Sentencing
Commission was ahead of the curve.”).
31. See Bowman, supra note 7, at 404 (“[I]n the weeks prior to Sarbanes-Oxley’s
enactment, a bidding war broke out between the House and Senate in which each chamber vied
for the honor of raising statutory maximum sentences for fraud-related crimes the farthest.
During the reconciliation process, the conferees simply accepted whichever figure was
highest.”).
32. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 386 (2003); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 § 905, 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. IV 2004).
33. See October Letter from Eric H. Jaso, supra note 29, at 270 (discussing proposed
amendments).  
34. See id. at 271 (“We suggest . . . that the Commission modify the fraud loss table . . . in
a manner that will ensure that incarceration is the rule, rather than the exception, in cases
involving losses up to $120,000.  Our proposal is that the table be revised such that probationary
sentences are reserved for truly minor offenders.”); see also Bowman, supra note 7, at 416
(“[B]y raising the base offense level and changing the low end of the loss table, the Department
sought to increase the number of defendants required to serve prison time.”).
of painstaking work that had gone into crafting measured and calculated
reforms for the 2001 Economic Crime Package, the government’s reaction to
the new barrage of corporate scandals came in a blurred rush as Washington
institutions fought for center stage.31  As the dust settled, Sarbanes-Oxley
emerged.  While SOX is perhaps best known for the creation of new statutes
and the amendment of statutory sentencing maximums, the law’s more
important legacy is its direction to the Sentencing Commission to review and
amend the Guidelines within 180 days to “reflect the serious nature of the
offenses and penalties set forth in [the] Act.”32  The message was clear,
Congress had increased sentences for fraud by four times and expected the
Sentencing Commission to make a similar demonstration of its commitment to
increasing punishments for financial criminals.
By October 2002, the DOJ was calling on the Sentencing Commission to
respond to the directions of SOX by increasing the applicable base offense level
for all fraud defendants from six points to seven points.33  The goal of the
proposal was to correct the 2001 Economic Crime Package’s lenient treatment
of low-loss fraud and to increase both the number of defendants serving prison
time and the length of such sentences.34  This seems a strange focus for the DOJ
given that the country was reacting to crimes involving hundreds of millions of
dollars.  For the DOJ, however, Enron created an opportunity to group all
financial crimes together and force reforms that touched all levels of fraud.  The
Sentencing Commission responded to the pressure and implemented the
requested change, though it limited the increase in base offense level to
defendants convicted of an offense carrying a maximum sentence of twenty
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss3/1
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35. See Bowman, supra note 7, at 432 (“Faced with the prospect that a Justice Department
appeal to Congress would receive support not only from Republicans but also from a prominent
Judiciary Committee Democrat [Senator Biden], the Commission voted for a broad-based, albeit
small and curiously structured, sentence increase.”).
36. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL POST-SARBANES-OXLEY AMENDMENTS (2003),
reprinted in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 301 (2003) [hereinafter FINAL SOX AMENDMENTS].  
37. Bowman, supra note 7, at 433 (footnote omitted); see also Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, supra note 27, at 231 (“And the apparently insignificant one-base-offense-level increase
for fraud offenders will preclude probationary, home or community confinement, or split
sentences for thousands of low-loss defendants.”).
38. See Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 27, at 231 (2003).
The Justice Department, which in June 2002 had pronounced itself happy with the
Economic Crime Package, in October 2002 discovered in Sarbanes-Oxley a
mandate from Congress to the Commission to increase economic crime sentences
on both corporate bigwigs and ordinary middle and low level fraud and theft
defendants.  DOJ proposed both specific enhancements for characteristically
corporate crime, and a loss table amendment significantly increasing sentences for
every defendant sentenced under Section 2B1.1 who caused a loss greater than
$10,000. 
Id. at 232-33; see also John R. Steer, The Sentencing Commission’s Implementation of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 263 (2003) (discussing the numerous amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines resulting from the passage of SOX, including more general across the
board enhancements for fraud).
years or more.35  Since SOX had increased the maximum sentence for the most
commonly charged fraud provisions to twenty years, the Guideline’s reform
impacted almost every financial crimes case.36  Commenting on the increase,
Frank Bowman, a noted academic who has published voluminously on the
subject of the Guidelines and who has previously served as Special Counsel to
the Sentencing Commission, described the significance of the one point change
in the loss table.
[T]hough a one-base-offense-level increase may seem insignificant,
it actually has profound effects on thousands of individual
defendants.  It bumps up the sentencing range of every federal fraud
defendant by one level, thus increasing the minimum guideline
sentence of defendants subject to imprisonment by roughly ten
percent.  Even more importantly, it limits judicial choice of sentence
type in four out of ten fraud cases prosecuted in federal court.37
Thus, while SOX led to numerous changes in the Sentencing Guidelines for
catastrophic financial crimes, its more resounding impact was to create an
atmosphere in which the DOJ could compel the Sentencing Commission to
increase sentences for fraud generally.38
The reform of financial crimes enforcement had come to fruition and the
tools to fight this war had been made available by the President, Congress, the
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39. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Statement on Corporate
Responsibility and the Creation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force (July 9, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/Jul/02_ag-388.htm.
40. Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., A Day with Justice (Oct. 28, 2002) (transcript
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speech/2002/102802daywithjustice.htm); see
also Christopher Wray, Prosecuting Corporate Crime, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Feb. 2005, at 12,
15, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0205/ijee/ijee0205.pdf (“Much has been
accomplished in the Department of Justice’s ongoing campaign against corporate fraud;
however, much remains to be done.  In order to restore full public confidence in the financial
markets, continued strong enforcement will be necessary to increase the level of transparency
of corporate conduct and of financial reporting and to strengthen the accountability of corporate
officials.”).  
DOJ, and the Sentencing Commission.  As prosecutors reviewed all they had
been given, the highest levels of government and the public itself waited
anxiously for news of the results.  The expectations were clear: America wanted
news of increased prosecutions and staggering sentences.
II. From Those to Whom Much Is Given . . .
During the post-Enron reform period, few days passed without a
pronouncement from the government regarding a new corporate investigation,
a victorious financial crimes trial, or a significant fraud sentence being handed
down.  From the beginning of the movement, Attorney General John Ashcroft
set the tone by proclaiming that the future would include increased focus on
financial crimes and increasingly harsh punishments for those convicted.
Shortly before SOX became final, he stated that the proposed reforms would
“make[] it clear that executives and companies will face tough penalties
including longer jail sentences for individuals.”39  Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson, head of the Corporate Fraud Task Force, also reinforced the
government’s message.
[T]hese [financial] crimes are particularly pernicious and
appropriately the subject of intense—and that is what they are
getting—law enforcement focus and action. . . . 
. . . .
. . . Our goal is to separate the offenders from law-abiding
companies.  In many cases, that separation will be physical and for
an extended term of years.  My hope is that comprehensive
enforcement efforts will restore investor confidence in the integrity
of the market by demonstrating that financial criminals will
pay—and they will pay with more than financial penalties.40
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41. CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, FIRST YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, at iii (2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/first_year_report.pdf.  The second such report read
much the same, proclaiming over 900 defendants had been charged within the Task Force’s first
two years.  See CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
at iii (2004) [hereinafter SECOND YEAR REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
2nd_yr_fraud_report.pdf.
42. See Tracy L. Coenen, Enron: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, WIS. L.J., June 7, 2006,
available at http://www.wislawjournal.com/archive/2006/0607/coenen-060706.html (discussing
public confidence in the markets as a result of the government’s prosecutions).
Change was coming swiftly, argued the government, because the public’s calls
for change had been answered through legislation and policy initiatives.
It did not take long for the government to move beyond predicting success
as a result of the government’s new war on financial crimes and to begin
proclaiming victory.  Only a year after the formation of the Corporate Fraud
Task Force, the financial SWAT team’s first-year report to the President read
like a recruiting poster.
Although our task was daunting, it was not impossible.  On this
one-year anniversary of the Corporate Fraud Task Force, I am
pleased to report that the Task Force has responded to the
President’s call for action with impressive results. . . .
. . . .
. . . Since its creation, the Task Force has been involved in well
over 320 criminal investigations involving more than 500 individual
subjects.  As of May 31, 2003, criminal charges were pending
against 354 defendants.  And 250 individuals have been convicted
or pled guilty to corporate fraud charges.41
As the number of prosecutions being touted by the government swelled, public
confidence in the markets grew and the public began to cheer the government’s
harsh response to the corporate improprieties that had permeated the country.42
The government was not resigned, however, to simply discussing the
growing number of financial crimes cases being disposed of each year.  Specific
examples also existed to demonstrate the success of SOX and the Sentencing
Guidelines amendments in increasing prison time.  One of the most well-
publicized cases was that of Dynegy’s mid-level executive, Jamie Olis.  Olis
refused to enter into a plea agreement and was convicted in a $105 million
stock fraud scheme.  Though his sentence was later reversed, the district court
initially sentenced Olis to twenty-four years and four months in prison.
Only days and weeks before in the same district, drug dealers, a
corrupt public official, a kiddie-porn collector and a six-time felon
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43. John Gibeaut, Do the Crime, Serve More Time, ABA J. E-REPORT, Apr. 2, 2004,
available at Westlaw, 3 No. 13 ABAJEREP 1; see also Carrie Johnson & Brooke A. Masters,
Cook the Books, Get Life in Prison: Is Justice Served?, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2006, at A1
(describing the staggering sentences received by Bernard Ebbers and Jamie Olis).  It should be
noted, though it will be discussed in greater detail during this article’s examination of
differentials in sentencing after plea agreements as opposed to trials, that Olis’s boss was
sentenced to fifteen months after pleading guilty and agreeing to testify against his subordinate.
See id.
XXThe same type of comparison was made when Bernard Ebbers, former head of WorldCom,
reported to prison to serve a twenty-five-year sentence that was akin to a life sentence for the
sixty-five-year-old with heart ailments. 
In the category of longest prison sentence, WorldCom Inc. founder Bernard J.
Ebbers recently bested the organizer of an armed robbery, the leaders of a Bronx
drug gang and the acting boss of the Gambino crime family.
Carrie Johnson & Brooke A. Masters, Paying the Price for Cooking the Books, WASH. POST
WKLY., Oct. 2-8, 2006, at 20.
44. See SECOND YEAR REPORT, supra note 41, at 3.14 (“Following a trial and guilty verdict,
on March 25, 2004, Dynegy’s former Senior Director of Tax Planning/International Tax and
Vice President of Finance was sentenced to more than 24 years for his role in a corporate fraud
scheme.”); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System:
Lessons from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
165, 188 (2004) (“The effect of the increased penalties following the 2001 reform is reflected
in the sentence received by Jamie Olis, a mid-level executive at Dynegy, an energy trading
firm.”).
45. Brickey, supra note 1, at 246; see also Bowman, supra note 7, at 398-99 (“[I]n keeping
with the emphasis on moral failure, the list of governmental actions proposed by the President
was headed by a call for increased enforcement of criminal laws and for ‘tough new criminal
penalties for corporate fraud.’”).
caught possessing a gun all received less time behind bars.  After
Olis was sentenced, prosecutors were quick to mount soapboxes and
proclaim that the days had ended when button-down crooks could
expect little more than a sharp rap on the knuckles.43
The government praised the case as an example of the tough new punishments
criminals faced, while the public watched with vindictive glee with memories
still fresh of all that had been lost to such villains.44
The public was not the only group soaking up the government’s claims that
the new tools granted by Congress, the DOJ, and the Sentencing Commission
were changing the face of financial crimes enforcement.  Scholars also began
writing about the reforms and the government’s claims of increasing
prosecutions.  In a 2004 article regarding Enron’s legacy, one scholar wrote,
“Unprecedented marshaling of federal regulatory and law enforcement
resources has contributed to significant criminal enforcement levels in the post-
Enron era.”45  Whether in response to specific reforms enacted after Enron or
as a result of the compilation of changes from various government institutions,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss3/1
2007] PLEA BARGAINING’S SURVIVAL 465
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amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines and the concurrent amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines for money laundering, another scholar stated, “Taken together, the amendments
should provide greater clarity to sentencing courts, uniformity in longer terms of imprisonment
for moderate and high levels of pecuniary harm, and specific deterrence to economic crime
offenders.”  Ramirez, supra note 32, at 361.
47. John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 114-15 (2005); see also Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
supra note 27, at 232 (explaining that while increases in statutory maximums have little impact
alone, these reforms coupled with amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines “add real years for
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many scholars also predicted that sentences for financial criminals would
increase.  Stephanos Bibas, who has written extensively about the post-Enron
period, concluded one article by stating that the Feeney Amendment would
result in fewer departures and “a transfer of even more plea-bargaining power
from judges to prosecutors, resulting in higher sentences on prosecutors’
terms.”46  In an article discussing his experiences as a member of the DOJ
Enron Task Force, John Kroger also estimated that higher sentences for a wide
range of defendants would result from post-Enron reforms.
The most important development has been in the area of criminal
punishment.  As noted above, white collar crimes have historically
been punished very lightly in the United States.  This scandalous
practice has come to an end.  Since late 2001, Congress and the
United States Sentencing Commission have radically increased
criminal penalties for persons convicted of white collar fraud. . . .
The United States Sentencing Commission has completely rewritten
the sentencing guidelines applicable to fraud cases in the last several
years.47
Such views appear to have been widely embraced and well received.  Given the
statements emanating from the DOJ and the plethora of new statutes and
Sentencing Guideline provisions available for use, however, it would have
appeared counterintuitive to argue otherwise.
While the public cheered and scholars discussed the government’s claims,
some involved in the criminal system perceived another potential impact
resulting from the government’s alleged success.  People began to question
whether the new enforcement regime and sentencing structure would affect plea
bargaining.  One defense attorney summarized the undercurrent of concern
when responding to the DOJ’s policy regarding charging the most readily
provable offense:  
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Bargaining, 73 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 24 (2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Charging Policy],
available at http://litigationcenter.bna.com/pic2/lit.nsf/id/BNAP-5RPJKS?Opendocument.
49. Robert Pack, Defense Lawyers and Federal Sentencing Guidelines, WASH. LAW., Oct.
2003, at 26.
50. Gary G. Grindler & Jason A. Jones, Please Step Away from the Shredder and the
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(2004) (“Skeptics, both within and outside of the DOJ, will no doubt argue that the policy will
have the opposite result, effectively stifling plea bargains that are often pivotal in securing the
information necessary to prosecute ‘up the chain.’  It is too early to tell.”).
“Defense attorneys will recognize that the worst possible outcome
at trial is the same as any settlement offer they get from
prosecutors.”  As a result, he said, “they will be ethically mandated
to take every case to trial.”  Federal courts could be overwhelmed
with cases going to trial, Wallace said, pointing to a report by the
U.S. Judicial Conference estimating that a five percent reduction in
guilty pleas would result in a 33 percent increase in trials.48
This concern was also raised in another article regarding post-Enron sentencing
reforms in which a partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP observed, “[i]n terms of
causing people to plead, you could make the argument that there are
disincentives to plead because the guidelines cause sentences to be so onerous
[now] that nobody can get around them, so you have to go try the case.”49
Finally, in an article dedicated to Sarbanes-Oxley, the former Principal
Associate Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton administration commented
that some believed the DOJ’s policies after Enron would simply stifle plea
bargaining in the federal system.50
Not everyone was convinced, however, that the flurry of activity after Enron
would lead to lower rates of plea bargaining.  Marc Miller, in an article
discussing prosecutorial power in sentencing, questioned the legitimacy of these
concerns and predicted a wildly different result.  
If many commentators who have praised the Department policies for
restricting plea bargains are correct, then they should expect a
reversal of the longstanding increase in guilty plea rates in the
federal system.  The availability of open pleas (pleas that are not the
product of bargains) means that the guilty plea rate may remain
high, but if the Attorney General has put a functioning brake on the
habit of making deals defendants cannot refuse, then, other things
being equal, some decrease in the guilty plea rate should result.  If
I am correct that the PROTECT Act simply increases prosecutorial
power compared to all other actors and therefore the ability to
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control plea/trial differentials, the guilty plea rate will hold steady
or continue to rise.51
Miller not only challenged the concerns of many in the defense bar regarding
the impact of post-Enron reforms, he also raised an issue at the heart of this
analysis: What has actually changed with regard to the focus on and sentencing
of financial criminals since 2001?
If one takes Miller’s statement one step further and argues that post-Enron
reforms did little more than increase prosecutorial power, are any of the
assumptions that have been made about the impact of SOX, the DOJ policies,
or the Sentencing Guidelines amendments correct?  Scholars, attorneys, and
laypersons alike appear to have embraced the position that the government’s
war on financial crimes would result and, in fact, has resulted in increased focus
on economic crimes and increasingly harsh sentences for all defendants caught
under the purview of the Sentencing Guidelines applicable to fraud.  Now that
seven years have passed, the need for speculation is over and one can examine
whether the Jamie Olis’s of the world were merely a blip on the screen of
federal enforcement or whether fundamental, broad-sweeping changes have
actually occurred.
III. While Wars Wage Above, The Trenches Lay Silent
The Sentencing Commission makes available statistical data dating from
1995 through 2006 regarding an array of matters traceable under the Sentencing
Guidelines.52  If, as has been argued, fundamental shifts have occurred in
financial crimes enforcement, such changes should be evident in the array of
data collected in these studies.  Furthermore, because these statistics pre-date
the corporate scandals by several years, even a gradual shift in focus should
become evident over time.
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2006 online.  See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Annual Reports and Statistical Sourcebooks,
http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Sentencing
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A. Has the Government’s Focus on Financial Crimes Prosecutions
Increased?
The first proposition advanced by the government following the collapse of
Enron and the ensuing rush for reform was that the government’s focus on
financial crimes has dramatically increased.  The Sentencing Commission
tracks the number of prosecutions each year in two categories related to the
government’s claim.  First, statistics are available for “Fraud” cases, which
include fraud and deceit and insider trading.  Second, statistics are available for
“Non-Fraud White Collar Cases” cases, which include embezzlement, forgery,
bribery, money laundering, and tax evasion.  Below are the numbers of
prosecutions for such offenses from 1995 through 2006.53
FIGURE 1
What is evident from these statistics is that a major shift in the number of
fraud cases has not occurred, and a reduction has actually resulted in the
number of non-fraud white collar crime prosecutions since 2001.  It is certainly
worthy of mention that by 2003 the government did increase fraud prosecutions
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by 760 cases from the number of cases in 2001.  This, coupled with the
subsequent decline in fraud prosecutions to a low of 6956 in 2005, only 128
more than in 2001, does little to bolster the government’s position that financial
crimes prosecutions have become a high priority for the DOJ. 
While the specific number of financial crimes prosecutions per year reveals
a significant gap between the government’s assertions and reality, even more
telling is an analysis of the percentage of offenders in the federal system for
whom fraud or non-fraud white collar crime was the primary offense category.54
Through an examination of these data, one can trace the DOJ’s commitment to
a particular subset of criminal activity relative to other crimes in a particular
year.  While there are limitations to the strength of such an analysis, it does
offer a glimpse at both the resources and the commitment of the government
over time, whether by choice or by circumstance.
FIGURE 2
Between 2001 and 2006, the percentage of offenders in the federal system
for whom fraud was the primary offense category declined from 11.4% to
9.7%.  Similarly, the percentage of offenders for whom non-fraud white collar
crime was the primary offense level declined from 6.4% to 4.8%.  These
declines continued a trend that had been present since 1995.  While this appears
counterintuitive given the government’s statements regarding its renewed focus
on financial crimes following Enron and similar corporate scandals, it appears
that the bulk of federal enforcement resources have been placed elsewhere.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
470 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:451
55. Id.
While many might assume that an increased focus on terrorism or drug cases
may have resulted in this down-swing, the actual culprit is immigration cases.
The percentage of offenders for whom an immigration violation was the
primary offense category grew from 8.3% in 1995 to 24.5% in 2006. 
It is difficult to know whether the increase in immigration cases represents
a true focus of the federal government to the detriment of the war on financial
crimes because immigration cases are often disposed of quickly through fast
track systems.  Therefore, it is worth examining the percentage of federal
defendants for whom the primary offense category was fraud or non-fraud
white collar crime from 1995 through 2006 when immigration cases are
removed from the calculations.55
FIGURE 3
These figures indicate that even when immigration cases are removed from
the data sets, the government’s focus on federal prosecution of financial crimes
as compared with other offense categories has diminished since 1995, with no
increase following Enron.  When compared to the previous graph, this figure
demonstrates a less abrupt decrease.  But, it also lends further support for the
position that the DOJ has not, as it claimed, increased fraud prosecutions.
Based on these data, it appears that the government’s new era in financial
crimes enforcement has not materialized.  Rather, perhaps it is more accurate
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to state that there is a perception that enforcement has increased because the
government has focused its efforts on a few high profile corporate scandals.
B. Have Sentences for Financial Crimes Increased?
With ever-increasing demands on the DOJ in various areas of federal
criminal law enforcement, it may seem irrelevant to some that the DOJ has not
increased the number of financial crimes cases since Enron.  For those who
embrace such an argument, perhaps there is a belief that increasing sentences
resulting from the 2001 Economic Crime Package, SOX, DOJ policies, and
subsequent Sentencing Guidelines amendments for fraud are sufficient to reign
in those who perpetrate such offenses.  As we have seen, however, predictions
regarding the impact of post-Enron reforms and government claims of success
do not necessarily equate into true change.  It is necessary, therefore, to
examine average and mean sentences of individuals convicted of fraud.  Below
is a graph demonstrating the mean and medium length of sentences for
individuals with fraud as their primary offense category.56
FIGURE 4
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59. See Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 27, at 232 (stating that the Economic
Crime Package went into effect in November 2001).  The mean sentence for fraud for 2002
through pre-Booker 2005 was 14.84 months, a 0.84 month increase over the average sentence
in 2001.  See supra Figure 4.
Again, the results are surprising.  Where are the “radical increases” predicted
by some as a result of SOX and the amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines?57  In 2001, the average sentence for fraud was fourteen months, a
0.8 month increase from the year before.  With the exception of one year, the
average sentence then climbed slightly towards, but never reached, fifteen
months until post-Booker 2005.58  Remembering that the 2001 Economic Crime
Package did not go into effect until November 2001 and would not have had an
impact on sentencing until 2002, it appears that both the sweeping Sentencing
Guidelines amendments made shortly before Enron and all of the post-Enron
reforms from Congress, the DOJ, and the Sentencing Commission combined to
increase sentences for economic crimes by less than one month in the years
shortly after Enron.59  When median sentences are examined, an even more
significant trend appears.  In 2001, before the impact of the 2001 Economic
Crime Package or post-Enron reforms were realized, the median sentence for
fraud increased to ten months for the first time since the Sentencing
Commission began tracking this information.  Following this brief spike, the
median returned to eight months in 2002.  Two years later, in the midst of the
government’s war on financial crimes, median sentences fell again to six
months.  An average defendant convicted of fraud, therefore, actually fared
better following Enron and the subsequent reforms.  Furthermore, that the
median sentence decreased after 2001 may indicate that any increase in mean
sentences resulted from only a select few staggering sentences in some of the
more publicized catastrophic fraud cases.
It must be noted that beginning with post-Booker 2005, a clear upward trend
begins to appear in the data, indicating that sentences for fraud are on the way
up.  To attribute this to reforms implemented years before and which were
apparently ineffective for the first four years of the war on financial crimes,
however, seems to ignore the more likely cause of this recent increase in
sentence length.  If one examines the data over time, it appears that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Booker had a much more significant and
immediate impact on sentences than all of the post-Enron reforms combined.
Apparently, Congress missed its mark by passing SOX and encouraging
amendments to the sentencing guidelines, when all that was really necessary to
meet their goals was to remove the mandatory nature of the sentencing
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crimes).”); see also Perino, supra note 1, at 684 (“In addition to creating new crimes, [SOX]
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guidelines.  While it is still too early to make definitive conclusions about the
impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, it appears that making the
sentencing guidelines advisory may be resulting in increasingly severe
sentences.  Regardless, and for purposes of this study, the increase in the length
of sentences following the Supreme Court’s actions in 2005 does not seem to
cloud the more relevant determination that no “radical increases” in prison
sentences resulted from the reforms implemented in response to Enron and
other corporate scandals.
Looking more closely at what the DOJ itself described as the most
commonly charged offenses for financial crimes, wire and mail fraud, one sees
a slightly improved result.60
FIGURE 5
While data beyond 2003 are not available for these specific offenses, in the
two years after Enron, only the mean sentence for mail fraud increased.  Mail
fraud sentences increased between 2001 and 2003 by more than ten percent.
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Commission’s sentencing statistics, such a change might lower average sentences as more
defendants with minimal prison time enter the statistical data sets.  Review of the statistics
tracking the number of fraud defendants receiving probation as opposed to prison sentences,
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30.8% of fraud defendants received probation, as compared with 34.8% and 32.4% in 2004 and
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63. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Reports, supra note 53.
Though these data are sparse, it does allow for some initial observations.  Recall
that Frank Bowen predicted that “though a one-base-offense-level increase [to
section 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines] may seem insignificant, it actually
has profound effects on thousands of individual defendants.  It bumps up the
sentencing range of every federal defendant by one level, thus increasing the
minimum guideline sentence of defendants subject to imprisonment by roughly
ten percent.”61  It is possible, therefore, that the ten percent increase in mail
fraud sentences is a direct result of the one point increase in defendants’ base
offense levels.  Curiously, if the one point increase in base offense level
affected mail fraud, why did it not equally impact wire fraud and all other fraud
offenses sentenced under section 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines?  That
there was no ten percent increase in fraud convictions generally indicates that
perhaps some as of yet unidentified influence was at work for mail fraud
between 2001 and 2003.  Regardless, it must be noted that the base offense
level amendment to section 2B1.1 was but one small act in a sea of changes
following the corporate scandals beginning in 2001.  If this Sentencing
Guidelines amendment is responsible for the increase in prison time for
defendants convicted of mail fraud, the looming question still remains: where
may the impact of all the other reforms be seen and why, even here, an impact
for financial crimes in general is absent.62
C. Have the Percentage of Cases Resulting in Plea Agreements Diminished?
Given that neither actual enforcement nor prison sentences for financial
crimes appear to have increased dramatically since 2001, our final question
seems already answered.  Have the number of cases resulting in plea
agreements decreased as many feared?63  The answer is no.
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 FIGURE 6
In the federal system as a whole, plea bargaining appears, as might have been
expected, to be thriving at well over 94.5% since 1999.  While minor
fluctuations are to be expected, it is curious that, of the years in which the
Sentencing Commission has kept data, the highest rate of plea bargaining
occurred in 2002.  After this spike, plea bargaining rates for each year for all
federal crimes rested comfortably between 94.5% and 96.6%.  These figures are
for all federal crimes, and one might expect that the greater impact would be
seen with regard to fraud cases specifically.  In examining the percentage of
plea bargaining in fraud cases, however, one does not find a significant impact
from post-Enron reforms.64
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FIGURE 7
Strikingly, the percentage of fraud cases resolved through guilty pleas
mimics the percentages for all federal criminal cases.  These data tell us several
important things about the impact of post-Enron reforms on financial crimes
plea bargaining.  First, any impact that may have occurred was minimal.  As
with federal criminal prosecutions generally, the percentage of defendants
pleading guilty to fraud remained above 95% for every year since 1999, with
the exception of post-Booker 2005.  Second, the percentage of cases resulting
in plea bargains is higher after 2001 than before, which is the opposite effect
predicted by some in the defense bar.65  Finally, as can be seen below, whatever
forces acted upon plea bargains in fraud cases during these years impacted the
entire institution of federal plea bargaining in the same manner.
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FIGURE 8
This means that if any of the reforms are directly attributable to these
fluctuations, such as the spike in 2002, it would have to result from a reform
that impacted not just financial crimes but all federal crimes.  Regardless, plea
bargaining remains alive and well, and the fears of those who believed the
federal criminal system was about to come crashing down have not
materialized.
Having examined the data, what must be asked is, after all that the
government did in response to corporate scandals and all that has been said
publicly about the war on financial crimes, why does it appear that little has
actually changed?  Why have financial crimes prosecutions not increased
dramatically?  Why are financial criminals receiving only marginally higher
sentences?  The answer may be found in the institution some felt was in
jeopardy because of post-Enron reforms: plea bargaining.  Prosecutors are not
using their weapons in the war on financial crimes to increase prosecutions or
prison sentences, but instead are using new statutes and the possibility of
monumental sentences as tools to encourage defendants to accept plea
agreements that include sentences similar to those offered before 2001.  For
those who refuse the government’s advances, prosecutors are prepared to use
all of their new powers to secure significantly higher sentences as both a
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66. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000) (emphasis
added); see also GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) [hereinafter FISHER, HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING].  For a
discussion of scholarship on plea bargaining generally and the debate over whether plea
bargaining is an appropriate part of our criminal justice system, see Jacqueline E. Ross,
Criminal Law and Procedure: The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States
Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPPLEMENT) 717 (2006).  
67. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979)
[hereinafter Alschuler, Plea Bargaining] (discussing the evolution of plea bargaining beginning
with an examination of confessions in twelfth century England); see also Albert W. Alschuler,
Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 211 (1979) [hereinafter Alschuler, Plea
History] (tracing the history of plea bargaining); Jeff Palmer, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: An
End to the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 508-11 (1999) (describing plea
bargaining’s existence in early American history and its rise to prominence in more recent
history); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1912 (1992) (commenting that plea bargaining “is not some adjunct to the criminal justice
system; it is the criminal justice system”).   
punishment for removing themselves from the plea bargaining machine and as
an example to others who might be considering the same foolish course.
IV. Plea Bargaining’s Continued Triumph
A. Plea Bargaining’s Rise
The history of plea bargaining’s growth is the history of prosecutors gaining
increased leverage to bargain.  George Fisher begins his seminal work on plea
bargaining in America, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, with a somber expression
of remorse over this machine’s rise to prominence and with a single statement
summarizing why this system in which rights are exchanged for concessions
triumphed.
There is no glory in plea bargaining.  In place of a noble clash for
truth, plea bargaining gives us a skulking truce. . . .  But though its
victory merits no fanfare, plea bargaining has triumphed. . . . 
The battle has been lost for some time. . . .  [V]ictory goes to the
powerful.66
Although plea bargaining, of course, pre-dates the American criminal justice
system, its evolution into a force that consumes over 95% of defendants in
America is a phenomenon confined predominantly to the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.67  This rise can be attributed to various forces, but, as Fisher
states above, the increasing power of prosecutors is the pinnacle reason for plea
bargaining’s success.
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68. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining, supra note 67, at 40; see also Alschuler, Plea History,
supra note 67.
69. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining, supra note 67, at 42 (“[T]he more formal and elaborate
the trial process, the more likely it is that this process will be subverted through pressures for
self-incrimination.”); see also Alschuler, Plea History, supra note 67.
70. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining, supra note 67, at 41.
71. See FISHER, HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 66, at 23 (stating that plea
bargaining is “an almost primordial instinct of the prosecutorial soul”); see also Stephanos
Bibas, Pleas’ Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024 (2004) (reviewing FISHER, HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING, supra note 66); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea
Bargaining in America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721 (2005) (reviewing FISHER, HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING, supra note 66).
72. FISHER, HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 66, at 210 (“[Sentencing
Guidelines] invest prosecutors with the power, moderated only by the risk of loss at trial, to
dictate many sentences simply by choosing one set of charges over another.”). 
73. For a discussion of charge bargaining and its use by prosecutors, see Boyd, supra note
19, at 592 (“Not only may a prosecutor choose whether to pursue any given case, but she also
decides which charges to file.”); Brown & Bunnell, supra note 25, at 1066-67 (“Like most plea
agreements in federal or state courts, the standard D.C. federal plea agreement starts by
identifying the charges to which the defendant will plead guilty and the charges or potential
charges that the government in exchange agrees not to prosecute.”); Jon J. Lambiras, White-
Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity Despite Uniform Guidelines?, 30 PEPP. L. REV.
459, 512 (2003) (“Charging decisions are a critical sentencing matter and are left solely to the
discretion of the prosecutor.  When determining which charges to bring, prosecutors may often
choose from more than one statutory offense.” (footnote omitted)); Moohr, supra note 44, at
Albert Alschuler, in discussing the history of plea bargaining, draws a similar
conclusion.  He states, the “history of plea negotiation [] is a history of
mounting pressure for self-incrimination, and in explaining this phenomenon,
a growth in the complexity of the trial process over the past two-and-one-half
centuries seems highly relevant.”68  While Alschuler’s article focuses on the
impact of growing complexities, he alludes to the way these forces bestow
power on prosecutors managing the criminal system and willing to offer
significant incentives for those who will bypass a trial.69  “When Joan of Arc
yielded to the promise of leniency that this court made,” comments Alshuler,
“she demonstrated that even saints are sometimes unable to resist the pressures
of plea negotiation.”70
In Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, Fisher further develops the idea that as the
criminal system becomes more complex, prosecutors gain increased powers to
offer significant incentives to defendants.71  Through analysis of plea
bargaining in Massachusetts, Fisher argues that as the criminal system becomes
more sophisticated, prosecutors gain the power to use selective charge
bargaining to offer reduced sentences for those who will negotiate.72  The key
element of this machine, of course, is prosecutorial discretion and the ability to
select from various criminal statutes with significantly different sentences.73
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177 (“The power of the prosecutor to charge is two-fold; the power to indict or not . . . and the
power to decide what offense to charge.”).
74. FISHER, HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 66, at 17; see also Boyd, supra note
19, at 591-92 (“While the main focus on the Sentencing Guidelines appeared to be narrowing
judicial discretion in sentencing, some critics argued that the Sentencing Guidelines merely
shifted the federal judges’ discretionary power to federal prosecutors.”); Miller, supra note 18,
at 1252 (“The overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal sentencing system, beyond the
Commission and the guidelines and mandatory penalties, is the virtually absolute power the
system has given prosecutors over federal prosecution and sentencing.”).
75. See FISHER, HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 66, at 230 (“[P]lea bargaining
grew so entrenched in the halls of power that today, though its patrons may divide its spoils in
different ways, it can grow no more.  For plea bargaining has won.”).
76. Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2003) (“The criminal justice system uses large sentence
Rather than arguing that this rise in power leveled off in the twentieth century
when the rate of plea bargaining in federal cases began to top 80%, Fisher
argues that the power to control the system and offer defendants deals has only
continued to increase.  As an example, he argues that the passage of the
Sentencing Guidelines in the last decade of the twentieth century greatly
increased prosecutors’ control of the system, and therefore, increased their
ability to force defendants into plea agreements.
Before the advent of modern sentencing guidelines, both prosecutor
and judge held some power to bargain without the other’s
cooperation. . . .  Today, sentencing guidelines have recast whole
chunks of the criminal code in the mold of the old Massachusetts
liquor laws.  By assigning a fixed and narrow penalty range to
almost every definable offense, sentencing guidelines often
empower prosecutors to dictate a defendant’s sentence by
manipulating the charges.  Guidelines have unsettled the old balance
of bargaining power among prosecutor, judge, and defendant by
ensuring that the prosecutor, who always had the strongest interest
in plea bargaining, now has almost unilateral power to deal.74
With prosecutors in firm control of the decision-making process, Fisher
concludes that the plea bargaining machine is unlikely to fall from its
triumphant state.75 
The rise in prosecutorial power to manipulate an ever more complex criminal
justice system and select from differing criminal statutes as a means of
controlling sentencing explains only half of the plea bargaining machine.
Without significant differences in the sentences available as a result of pleading
guilty as opposed to risking trial, plea bargaining cannot contain enough of an
incentive for defendants to give up the fight.76  In a 1981 article on plea
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discounts to induce guilty pleas.  Of course these discounts exert pressure on defendants to
plead guilty.”).  Along with sentencing differentials, of course, are considerations by the
defendant of the likelihood of success at trial.  See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2465 (2004) (“In short, the classic shadow-of-
trial model predicts that the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence
largely determine plea bargains.”).  A prosecutor, however, has less control of a defendant’s
perceptions of these odds, and, as such, this topic is less applicable to our discussion. 
77. Alschuler, supra note 26, at 652-53 (footnote omitted).  Alschuler goes on to state:
“Although the empirical evidence is not of one piece, the best conclusion probably is that in a
great many cases the sentence differential in America assumes shocking proportions.”  Id. at
654-56; see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 251 (2006) (“While practitioners disagree about
the acceptability of a large sentence differential between the post-plea and post-trial sentence,
they agree that such a differential is common.” (footnote omitted)).  
78. See David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty?: Differential
Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 45, 55-59 (1981-
82); see also H. J. Shin, Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing and Parole
Process, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 27 (1973) (finding that charge reduction directly results in reduction
of the maximum sentence available and indirectly results in lesser actual time served).   
79. See Brereton & Casper, supra note 78, at 55-59; see also Daniel Givelber, Punishing
Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1363, 1382 (2000) (“The differential in sentencing between those who plead and those
convicted after trial reflects the judgment that defendants who insist upon a trial are doing
something blameworthy.”); Tung Yin, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant
to a Plea Agreement in Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 443
(1995) (“Curiously, the arena of plea bargaining pits the concepts of duress and consideration
against each other: a large sentencing differential makes it more likely that a defendant is
coerced into pleading guilty, and yet it also increases the benefit offered in exchange for the
guilty plea.”). 
bargaining, Alschuler wrote of this “differential” and stated, “Criminal
defendants today plead guilty in overwhelming numbers primarily because they
perceive that this action is likely to lead to more lenient treatment than would
follow conviction at trial.  A number of studies suggest this perception is
justified.”77  Among such studies was an examination by David Brereton and
Jonathan Casper that analyzed robbery and burglary defendants in three
California jurisdictions.78  The results were shocking and illustrated that
defendants who exercised their constitutional right to a trial received
significantly higher sentences than those who worked with prosecutors to reach
an agreement.79  Not limiting themselves to a mere observation of sentencing
trends, the researchers also made an insightful statement regarding the impact
of high differentials on the rates of plea bargaining:
The point of the preceding discussion is simple enough: when
guilty plea rates are high, expect to find differential sentencing.  We
believe that recent arguments to the effect that differentials are
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80. See Brereton & Casper, supra note 78, at 69. 
81. See id. at 45 (“It is this sentence differential (whether conceived of as a reward to guilty
pleaders or as a punishment of those who waste the court’s time by ‘needless’ trials) which has
traditionally been seen as the engine driving the plea-bargaining assembly line.”); see also
Givelber, supra note 79, at 1382 (“The pragmatic justification for differential sentencing is
simple and powerful: we want those charged with crimes to plead guilty, and differential
sentencing provides an accused with a strong incentive to do just that.”).
82. See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 46 (1983) (“The sentencing differential
between defendants who are convicted at trial and those who accept the prosecutor’s offer to
plead guilty is so pervasive and so substantial that few defendants are foolhardy enough to risk
testing the prosecutor’s determination of the ‘value’ of their case.”).  
83. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12-13 (1978)
(footnote omitted).  While some argue that increased differentials encourage innocent
defendants to waive their right to a trial, thus producing an unjust result, Frank Easterbrook
argues that this does not mean plea bargaining itself is an unacceptable institution.
XXFrom a market perspective, acceptance of such pleas [from innocent
defendants] is no mystery.  Sometimes the evidence may point to guilt despite the
defendant’s factual innocence.  It would do defendants no favor to prevent them
largely illusory do not withstand serious scrutiny, even though this
revisionist challenge has been valuable in forcing us to examine
more closely what is too often taken to be self-evidently true.80
Significant differentials, Brereton and Casper argued, are a tool used to increase
plea bargaining rates by increasing the incentives for negotiation.81
Under the above theory, that as differentials increase so too do the incentives
to accept a prosecutor’s offer, it must also be true that at some point
differentials are so extreme as to make rejection of a plea agreement irrational
regardless of guilt or innocence.82  Such realizations have led some to argue that
plea bargaining is equivalent to torture. 
We coerce the accused against whom we find probable cause to
confess his guilt.  To be sure, our means are much politer; we use no
rack, no thumbscrew, no Spanish boot to mash his legs.  But like the
Europeans of distant centuries who did employ these machines, we
make it terribly costly for an accused to claim his right to the
constitutional safeguard of trial.  We threaten him with a materially
increased sanction if he avails himself of his right and is thereafter
convicted.  The sentencing differential is what makes plea
bargaining coercive.  There is, of course, a difference between
having your limbs crushed if you refuse to confess, or suffering
some extra years of imprisonment if you refuse to confess, but the
difference is of degree, not kind.  Plea bargaining, like torture, is
coercive.83
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from striking the best deals they could in such sorry circumstances.  And if the
probability of the defendant’s guilt is indeed low even on evidence that would be
placed before the court . . . the sentencing differential will be correspondingly
steep.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 320
(1983); see also F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting
the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB.
L. 189, 204 (2002) (“The innocent defendant [] may regard the incentives as holding more value
because he perceives the system as unreliable.”).  What Easterbrook’s discussion fails to
recognize is the significant economic costs associated with taking a case to trial.  As such, if the
differential is significant enough, an individual might plead guilty to avoid the financial
devastation that could result from forcing a trial he or she may actually win. 
84. See September Memorandum, supra note 18, at 130 (regarding the Department of
Justice policy concerning charging criminal offenses, disposition of charges, and sentencing);
see also July Memorandum, supra note 20, at 376 (regarding the Feeney Amendment to the
PROTECT Act).
Regardless of the legitimacy of such a dramatic characterization of a
mechanism which is a vital aspect of the American criminal justice system,
statements such as the one above serve to reinforce the persuasive value of large
sentencing disparities and remind us that prosecutors benefit from increased
control and higher maximum sentences because these weapons allow them to
increase differentials to encourage bargaining.
B. The Continued Triumph
As has been discussed, plea bargaining relies on two fundamental elements:
a prosecutor’s power to structure and offer a plea bargain and the significance
of the differential between the sentence available through negotiations and the
sentence a defendant risks if unsuccessful at trial.  Through consideration of
these two elements, the reasons for the failure of post-Enron reforms to result
in increased prosecutions or prison sentences becomes clear, and the
expectation of some that these reforms might lead to decreasing plea bargaining
rates seems to ignore the true operation of the plea bargaining machine.
When examined in light of the discussion above, each post-Enron reform
either serves to increase prosecutorial power to charge bargain and select
sentencing ranges, increase the top end of differentials faced by defendants, or
do nothing at all to impact prosecutors’ ability to deal.  Let us begin with the
DOJ policies issued in 2003, aimed at ensuring the most readily provable
offense is charged and enlisting prosecutors in the battle to frustrate the
instances of downward departures.84  As discussed previously, if the September
22 memorandum requiring that a prosecutor charge the most readily provable
offense were followed, there would be little incentive for defendants to enter
into plea bargains because the differential between the offered plea and the
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85. See Alschuler, supra note 26, at 657; Ashcroft Charging Policy, supra note 48, at 24.
86. See G. Jack King, Jr., NACDL Survey: USAOs Deny Ashcroft Memo Affecting Plea
Bargaining, CHAMPION, Dec. 2003, at 6. 
87. See id.
88. See id.; see also Miller, supra note 18, at 1254.
89. Miller, supra note 18, at 1257.
90. See FISHER, HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 66, at 17; see also Boyd, supra
note 19, 591-92 (“While the main focus of the Sentencing Guidelines appeared to be narrowing
judicial discretion in sentencing, some critics argued that the Sentencing Guidelines merely
shifted the federal judges’ discretionary power to federal prosecutors.”).
sentence at trial would become inconsequential.85  As plea bargains have not
decreased, therefore, the logical conclusion is that prosecutors have ignored this
memorandum in so far as it attempts to limit their discretion to create incentives
for defendants.  Prosecutors have themselves supported this conclusion by
admitting that the memorandum has made no difference in their daily
operations.  Shortly after the memorandum’s release, an article appearing in The
Champion described the impact of the policy as “[n]ot much.”86  As the article
highlights, USAO’s responded to a survey by indicating that it was “still
business as usual in the courthouse.”87  While most prosecutors argued that
nothing had changed because they were abiding by the memorandum’s dictates
before its release, the true message being conveyed was that plea bargaining
remained alive and well.88  Of course, that plea bargaining and the status quo
survived the DOJ mandate does not mean prosecutors were in open violation
of the memorandum.  Rather, the memorandum itself had been structured to
allow prosecutors to attain compliance without amending their procedures
because “the tough-sounding 2003 policies include exceptions that any wise
prosecutor (and there are many wise prosecutors) could drive a truck through.”89
Whether this was purposeful or an inadvertent window through which business
as usual could endure, the end result was that charge bargaining and the
incentives created by this system continued to exist.
While it appears that the September 22 DOJ memorandum did little to
change day-to-day operations, the July 28 DOJ memorandum enforcing the
Feeney Amendment had an actual and significant impact.  By removing the
ability of judges to grant downward departures in certain cases and creating a
system in which the DOJ would both monitor and challenge all unsupported
downward departures, prosecutors gained further power to control the system
in which they operate.  George Fisher, with regard to the passage of the
Sentencing Guidelines, argued that as judges lose the ability to influence
sentences, prosecutors become the lone gatekeeper and controllers of the
discretionary elements of the sentencing process.90  It appears that the Feeney
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91. Miller, supra note 18, at 1257-58.
92. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 903, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (Supp. IV 2004)
(listing criminal penalties for mail and wire fraud); see also Brickey, supra note 11, at 378-79
(comparing pre-SOX and post-SOX penalties for fraud).
Amendment has resulted in the same increase in prosecutorial discretion to the
detriment of the judiciary.
Even if prosecutors limit their reliance on the specified exceptions,
prosecutorial power would still increase under the PROTECT Act.
This is so because the restriction on visible downward departures
that is the purpose of the Act gives prosecutors greater control over
the likely sentencing range.  Because prosecutors can control the
sentencing range, they can control the likely (expected) differential
in sentence after plea and after trial.91
The post-Enron DOJ policy regarding the Feeney Amendment, therefore, gave
prosecutors enhanced abilities to structure the sentences resulting from plea
bargaining and from trial to maximize the differential.  While it is certainly true
that prosecutors simply could have used these new powers to challenge
downward departures in an effort to increase the average sentences for all those
convicted in the federal system, statistics regarding prison sentences and plea
bargaining rates in financial crimes cases do not support this conclusion.
Rather, the data support an argument more consistent with the literature
explaining the function of the plea bargaining machine.  That is, prosecutors
have continued to offer financial crimes defendants plea deals with pre-Enron
sentences, while simultaneously using their new powers to increase the
projected sentence if a defendant rejects the plea offer and risks trial.
Congressional action in the form of SOX and subsequent amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines were offered amidst the same discussion of increased
enforcement and punishment as the DOJ memoranda above.  It appears,
however, that these post-Enron reforms have also failed to achieve their
proposed effect, instead merely offering prosecutors more tools to perpetuate
the dominance of plea bargaining.  First, SOX offered prosecutors new crimes
with which to charge defendants, presumably intended to assist in the expansion
of financial crimes prosecutions.  According to the statistical data, however, this
did not occur.  Second, SOX offered prosecutors a fourfold increase in the
sentence for the most commonly charged fraud offenses, wire and mail fraud
and conspiracy to commit fraud.92  Again, however, the sentencing data do not
reflect a significant increase in prison time for financial criminals as a result of
these SOX measures.  It appears, therefore, that once again prosecutors have
chosen to use post-Enron reforms to increase their power and control of
sentencing rather than to increase prosecutions and/or prison sentences.
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93. See Miller, supra note 18, at 1253.
What the federal guidelines have allowed is vastly greater prosecutorial control
not only over the actual sentences, but over the plea/trial differential.  Even
changes such as mandatory penalties that appear to reduce prosecutorial discretion
in fact increase prosecutorial control since prosecutors choose whether to charge
a crime triggering mandatory sentences, and whether to propose the one kind of
departure (substantial assistance) that allows departures below mandatory
minimum sentences.
Id.; see also William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2569 (2004) (“The bodies of law, state and federal, that claim to define
crimes and sentences do not really do what they claim.  Instead, those bodies of law define a
menu—a set of options law enforcers may exercise, or a list of threats prosecutors may use to
induce the plea bargains they want.”).
94. See supra Part I.C.
95. See Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 27, at 232 (explaining that while
increases in statutory maximums have little impact alone, these reforms coupled with
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines “add real years for real defendants”); see also
Bowman, supra note 7, at 389; Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 27, at 7.
96. See FINAL SOX AMENDMENTS, supra note 36; see also Bowman, supra note 7, at 433;
Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 27, at 231.
97. See Kroger, supra note 47, at 114-15; see also Bowman, supra note 7, at 433; Bowman,
Through SOX, prosecutors have gained the power to increase differentials
by offering a defendant a plea agreement which does not include wire or mail
fraud nor one of the newly created statutes carrying a large sentence.  The result
is that prosecutors have more discretion to choose between statutes with wildly
different statutory maximums to increase the differential between the plea offer
and the possible sentence resulting from trial.  As an example, a prosecutor
might agree to charge an offense that carries a maximum prison sentence of five
years in return for a plea agreement, but threaten to charge the defendant with
mail or wire fraud if she proceeds to trial.93  If, as has been discussed,
differentials are the key to a prosecutor’s ability to plea bargain, SOX opened
the door to staggering new prosecutorial power.
While increased statutory maximums are relatively meaningless without
accompanying Sentencing Guidelines amendments, pre-Enron Sentencing
reforms, SOX, and post-SOX Sentencing Guidelines initiatives addressed this
issue.94  Through passage of the 2001 Economic Crime Package, Congress
significantly increased the sentencing range for fraud shortly before the
corporate calamities of 2001.95  Not satisfied, further amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines were adopted following SOX that, among other changes,
added one point to the base offense level depending on the statutory charge in
the case.96  While many predicted that these initiatives would culminate in
drastically increased sentences for financial criminals, the sentencing statistics
show only a minor increase.97  Again, it appears that while prosecutors could
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 27, at 231.
98. See Bowman, supra note 7, at 434 (“[S]etting different base offense levels within the
same guideline based on the statutory maximum sentence of the offense of conviction results
in a net transfer of sentencing discretion to prosecutors.”). 
99. Gibeaut, supra note 43; Johnson & Masters, supra note 43, at A1.
100. See Bruce Zucker, Settling Federal Criminal Cases in the Post-Enron Era: The Role
of the Court and Probation Office in Plea Bargaining Federal White Collar Cases, 6 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).  Though Fastow’s initial deal with the government was rejected
by the court, it provides an example of the significant differential between the government’s
plea offer and the sentence Fastow faced at trial.  Id. at 3-5.
have used the 2001 Economic Crime Package, SOX, and the subsequent
Sentencing Guideline amendments to increase enforcement and ratchet up
punishments, prosecutors instead have used these reforms to increase their
power over sentencing differentials.  Just as the selection of a particular
statutory offense changes the maximum allowable sentence, so too does the
selection of a statute affect a defendant’s base offense level.98  By offering
defendants a plea agreement which includes conviction for a statute carrying a
six point, rather than seven point, base offense level, prosecutors can
significantly impact a defendant’s sentence.  Therefore, the result of the
adoption of this Sentencing Guidelines amendment, which was intended to
increase sentences for all fraud cases, was to further strengthen plea
bargaining’s triumph and ensure that prosecutors have the tools necessary to
present defendants with large differentials as incentives to plead guilty.
Further evidence to support the above conclusions is found through
examination of post-Enron cases where one can compare the differential
between the plea offer the government presented and the sentence the defendant
faced at trial.  The best example of the significance of the post-Enron
differential is Jamie Olis of Dynegy.99  Olis, a mid-level executive, was initially
sentenced in excess of twenty four years after losing at trial.  In comparison, the
CEO of the company only received fifteen months in return for a guilty plea.
As a mid-level executive, one must imagine Olis was offered a similar, if not
more lenient, deal.  Therefore, Olis likely faced a differential of fifteen months
for pleading guilty or 292 months for proceeding to trial, an almost 2000%
increase for putting the government to its burden.  It is hard to imagine any
defendant, including an innocent one, rejecting such odds.  Olis, however,
exercised his right to a trial, and, unlike his colleagues, reaped the full wrath of
post-Enron reforms.  Another example is Lea Fastow, former Director and
Assistant Treasurer of Corporate Finance at Enron, who was offered a plea deal
that required her to plead guilty to a single count of filing a false tax return and
serve one year of supervised release.100  If she had rejected the offer, she would
have gone to trial facing a six count indictment that charged her with
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participation in a $17 million fraud.  If convicted on these six counts, her
sentence may have exceeded ten years in prison.101  Unlike Olis, Fastow chose
not to risk facing the trial differential.  Other instances of staggering sentences
do not allow for a glimpse at what was offered by the government, but do
illustrate the type of sentences faced by those who go to trial.  For instance,
Bernard Ebbers, former head of WorldCom, was sentenced to twenty-five years
in prison.102  More recently, Jeffrey Skilling, former chief executive of Enron,
was sentenced to twenty-four years and four months in prison.103  It appears,
therefore, that while those who risk trial face the possibility of radically
increased sentences, the 95% or more of defendants who plead guilty, even in
some of the most publicized post-Enron cases, have received sentences similar
to those handed down in these types of cases for over a decade.
Conclusion
Plea bargaining is an integral part of the American criminal justice system,
and it rose to prominence because prosecutors gained sufficient control of the
system to offer defendants incentives to confess.  While many believed that
post-Enron reforms would result in increased prosecutions, higher sentences,
and, perhaps, less plea bargaining, the actual impact was simply to increase
prosecutors’ control of the criminal justice system, in turn perpetuating the
prominence of the plea bargaining machine.  With more tools and increased
control, prosecutors have increased differentials in financial crimes cases to
staggering new levels by offering plea bargains carrying sentences similar to the
pre-Enron era while threatening sentences following trial that take full
advantage of SOX and the new Sentencing Guidelines structure.  While it is
possible that these new powers could actually result in more defendants
accepting plea offers in the future, plea bargaining rates have been so high in
recent years there is little room left for expansion.  Plea bargaining triumphed
many years ago, and, therefore, the reforms following Enron merely served to
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perpetuate this triumph and further solidify plea bargaining’s place in the
criminal justice system.
The promises of SOX, the DOJ policy memoranda, and the Sentencing
Commission amendments remain unfulfilled.  While these post-Enron reforms
affected the war on financial crimes, the true impact was merely to aid in plea
bargaining’s survival, not to get tough on the majority of financial criminals.
For most of those accused of financial crimes, therefore, little is different;
ninety-five percent or more will receive a sentence relatively unchanged by the
events of the last seven years.  For those few souls that do risk trial, the outlook
has become much more severe.  So, in many ways, one can argue that the most
significant legacy of the government’s efforts to get tough on financial
criminals is to have created further incentives for defendants to plead guilty and
further risks for those who put the government to its burden at trial.
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